The joint go-nogo Simon effect (joint cSE; aka Social Simon Effect) has been considered as an index of automatic action/task co-representation. Recent findings, however, challenge extreme versions of this social co-representation account by suggesting that the (joint) cSE results from any sufficiently salient event that provides a reference for spatially coding one's own action. By manipulating the salient nature of reference-providing events in an auditory go-nogo Simon task, the present study indeed demonstrates that spatial reference events do not necessarily require social (Experiment 1) nor movement features (Experiment 2) to induce action coding. As long as events attract attention in a bottom-up fashion (e.g., auditory rhythmic features; Experiment 3 and 4), events in an auditory go-nogo Simon task seem to be corepresented irrespective of the agent or object producing these events. This suggests that the cSE does not necessarily imply the co-representation of tasks. The Theory of Event Coding provides a comprehensive account of the available evidence on the cSE: the presence of another salient event requires distinguishing the cognitive representation of one's own action from the representation of other events, which can be achieved by referential coding -the spatial coding of one's action relative to the other events.
INTRODUCTION
Studies on human cognition and action have a long tradition in investigating single individuals while they perform tasks that matter mainly for themselves (or the experimenter) and that they can carry out without the help of others. Except for studies explicitly targeting social interactions, the presence of other people is commonly considered a possible experimental artifact that is to be avoided as far as possible.
However, recent research has started to address the issue whether and how the cognitive representation of, and the performance on a task might change in the presence of other individuals working on the same task, whether people automatically coordinate their actions, and how they manage to engage in joint action requiring such coordination (e.g., Zajonc, 1965; Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1986; ; Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) . One of the most prominent paradigms used to investigate the cognitive representation of co-actors is known as the "Joint/ Social Simon task", which has been developed by Sebanz, Knoblich and Prinz (2003) . In this paradigm two participants share a task that is commonly used for investigating single participants: the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967; Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 1970) .
In the standard Simon task, single participants carry out spatially defined responses (e.g., left and right key presses) to non-spatial stimulus attributes (e.g., auditory pitch or visual color) that randomly appear on the left or right side of some reference point (e.g., the center of a screen or a fixation mark). Although stimulus location is entirely irrelevant, responses are faster when they spatially correspond to the stimulus signaling them-the (standard, "solo") Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967) .
Most models account for this effect by assuming that a match between spatial stimulus locations and spatial response locations facilitates response selection, be it because of a direct association between (e.g., De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) or the identity of the codes representing these locations (e.g., Hommel, 1993; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001) , or because attentional shifts prime spatially corresponding responses (e.g., Nicoletti & Umiltà, 1989; 1994) . However, a mismatch between stimulus and response locations is assumed to create competition between the primed response and the response required by the instruction (dual-route model; Kornblum et al., 1990) . If participants respond with one response to only one of the two stimuli, rendering the task a "go-nogo task", the individual Simon effect disappears under most circumstances (FOOTNOTE 1) (Hommel, 1996) . Most interesting for our purposes, however, the effect reappears if the same go-nogo Simon task is distributed over two participants, so that each of them operates one of the two responses (Sebanz et al., 2003) -the so-called Social Simon effect (SSE).
The discovery of the SSE has been considered to demonstrate automatic action/task co-representation (Tsai & Brass, 2007) and, more generally, "the fundamental social nature of perception and action" .
However, an increasing number of observations do not seem to fit with the implications of such co-representational accounts (Dolk et al., 2011; Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010; Hommel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009; Kuhbandner, Pekrun & Maier, 2010; Liepelt, Wenke, Fischer, & Prinz, 2011; Liepelt, Wenke, & Fischer, 2012; Vlainic, Liepelt, Colzato, Prinz, & Hommel, 2010) . For instance, Guagnano et al. (2010) found that the SSE occurs only if the two co-actors are sitting side-by-side in reaching distance but not if the distance increases further. The authors account for this observation by assuming that co-actors provide a kind of automatically induced spatial reference frame if, and only if, they are located within a participant's peripersonal space.
According to this logic, it is this (peripersonal) reference frame that renders the participant's own action as "left" or "right", while without such referential frame the action would not be spatially coded. Given that the Simon effect is considered to reflect the match or mismatch between spatial stimulus and response codes, it presupposes the existence of spatial response codes, so that in a go-nogo task the effect would appear only if the participant is coding his or her action as left or right-which he or she does as a consequence of the presence of a close-by co-actor.
While Guagnano et al.'s (2010) consideration that the presence of co-actors might induce particular spatial reference frames is important (and we will get back to this later), it is insufficient to explain the impact of a number of situational variables on the SSE. For instance, from their approach it is difficult to understand why the SSE is insensitive to the visibility of the co-actor (Vlainic et al., 2010) but highly affected if the participant is in bad mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010) or has a negative relationship with the co-actor (Hommel et al., 2009 ). Moreover, a previous study of ours suggested that even the presence of a co-actor may be irrelevant for the SSE to occur. In fact, Dolk et al. (2011) demonstrated a Simon-like effect even in the absence of any co-actor. They combined an auditory social Simon task with a manipulation of the perceived ownership of a co-acting hand. In a first experiment, two individuals co-performed each on one of the stimuli, with one of their hands, while the other hand was hidden from view. Before each trial, the participant's occluded left hand was either synchronously or asynchronously stimulated to the co-actors left hand -a manipulation that commonly increases and decreases, respectively, the perceived ownership of other body parts, known as the Rubber Hand Illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) . Results showed that the SSE was smaller in the synchronous as compared to the asynchronous stroking condition. This finding suggests that the SSE reflects or relies on the separation of spatial action events rather than the integration of the other person's action.
Interestingly, reliable SSEs were also found when the co-actor did not actively participate in the task and even when there was no other person physically present.
However, as the stroking manipulation was still running in the latter condition, it might have induced some sort of action ownership (e.g., over the stroking procedure), so that one might argue that the experimental situation still comprised two active "agents" or "effectors". But nevertheless, it seems clear that the physical presence of another individual-be it within or outside peripersonal space-is not necessary for the SSE to occur.
The observation that the go-nogo Simon effect can be elicited as a consequence of both social and non-social action events (Dolk et al., 2011) renders the term "Social Simon Effect" potentially misleading and unnecessarily theoretically biased. Accordingly, in the present article we adopted the more neutral task typology suggested by Donders (1969) and will refer to single and joint go-nogo Simon tasks as "cSE"-tasks (as they qualify as Donders' type c tasks). Consequentially, we will distinguish between single and joint effects by reserving the term cSE (or single cSE for clarity) for the individual go-nogo Simon effect and using the term joint cSE for effects resulting from the same go-nogo Simon task when carried out by more than one person.
The aim of the present study was to provide empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for a radical alternative to the available social interpretations of the (joint) cSE: humans may perceive other humans, and even themselves, just like any other event, be it social or non-social in nature (Dolk et al., 2011; Hommel et al., 2009 ). As we will argue, and explain in more detail below, performing a task like the Simon task requires the preparation and selection of intentional actions, which according to ideomotor theories are accessed through the activation of the codes representing their perceivable effects (Hommel, 2010; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1987) . In other words, action control operates on perceptual representations of events. Even though these events happen to be produced by, and are thus under the control of the actor, their representations are not different from the representations of events that are not under the actor's control.
This implies that action control faces a discrimination problem: the actor needs to select the one event representation that is associated with the required action from the set of all currently active event representations (FOOTNOTE 2). In psychological experiments, care is taken to avoid more stimulation than necessary, so that the selection process will be easy and straightforward. But bringing in another actor, effector, and/or action is likely to challenge the action selection process by introducing other active event representations into the actor's cognitive workspace. Solving this selection problem is not unlike selecting stimuli in a task in which relevant targets are mixed with irrelevant distractors, such as in visual search or flanker tasks. Such tasks are commonly assumed to require "directing attention" to the relevant information, which is another term to refer to the prioritized processing of the attributes of the selected event. To select an event representation against competitors requires the specification of the selection criterion, which in many attentional tasks is assumed to be spatial in nature (Bundesen, 1990; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . This means that introducing additional events to an experimental setting is likely to increase the task-relevance of the location of the required response(s). Moreover, the stimuli in a standard Simon task vary in a horizontal location, which renders the horizontal dimension particularly salient.
As task-relevance can be assumed to increase the weight of codes of event features (Hommel et al., 2001 : intentional weighting principle; see Memelink & Hommel, in press) and thereby increase their impact on information processing (i.e., receiving "more attention"), increasing the task relevance of the (horizontal) response location is likely to induce the Simon effect where it otherwise would not occur or increase its size. If so, any sufficiently salient event in a Simon task can be suspected to increase the taskrelevance of spatial response location and thereby induce a Simon effect or increase its size, especially if the event falls onto the same horizontal dimension as the response.
In contrast to previous approaches to the joint cSE, which all require the presence of another person (e.g., Guagnano et al., 2010; Sebanz et al., 2003; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005) , our radical event alternative denies the necessity of some degree of socialness of the experimental situation. In fact, it suggests that any event can produce a (single or joint) cSE-even though social events may be particularly powerful in doing so. In the following, we present five experiments that aimed at testing this prediction by systematically decreasing the social nature of the cSE-inducing event.
Thereafter, we present our theoretical approach in more detail and discuss how it accounts for the available evidence.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether even a non-social "co-actor" on the left can produce a "social" Simon effect (cSE) by providing a spatial reference in the horizontal plane that renders the participant's own action "right". To that end, we had single subjects perform an auditory go-nogo Simon task (as in Dolk et al., 2011) in the presence or absence of a salient non-social action event located to their left. This event consisted of a Japanese waving cat, which was present in one block of trials and absent in another. We assumed that the presence of the cat would be sufficiently salient to induce an alternative event representation into the participant's cognitive workspace. To resolve the resulting competition, participants should be more likely to select their response with respect to its relative location (i.e., relative to the cat), which again should render response location task-relevant and, as a consequence, induced a Simon effect.
Accordingly, we expected a Simon effect in the 'Cat present' condition but not in the 'Cat absent' condition.
Method

Participants.
Sixteen healthy undergraduate students (8 female; 21-29 years of age (M = 24,3, SD = 2.3) with no history of neurological or hearing problems participated. All subjects were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory scale (laterality score range: +77 to +100 over a range of -100 (fully left-handed) and +100 (fully right-handed); Oldfield, 1971) , had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, Participants were able to see the cat in the peripheral visual field (subtending a visual angle of 35.2º x 21.34º) and to hear the (unpredictable and non-metrical) sound produced by the waving. The 'Cat absent' condition was identical except that the Japanese waving cat was removed, leaving the table on the subject's left empty. In both conditions subjects were instructed to respond exclusively to the assigned stimulus sound irrespective of its location (left or right) and to keep fixating a white fixation cross in the centre of a computer monitor in front of them (subtending a visual angle of 1.9º x 1.9º; Figure 1 ).
There were four blocks of 64 trials for each go and nogo-signal (32 with a spatially compatible stimulus-response relationship and 32 with a spatially incompatible stimulus-response relationship). Each trial began with the presentation of a warning sound for 300 ms. After 1000 ms, the critical sound -either signal A or B -was presented for 300 ms to the right or the left side of the subject, who was instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to their individual target signal (either signal A or B, balanced across subjects). After a response was given or 1700 ms had passed, a 1000 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) followed. The whole experiment took approximately 40 min.
For statistical analysis, we excluded all trials in which the responses were incorrect (0.1%) and/or the reaction times (RTs) were above or below 2.5 standard deviations of the individual RT mean per design cell (2.3%). Responses were coded as compatible (stimulus ipsilateral to the correct response side) and incompatible (stimulus contralateral to the correct response side). To investigate the cSE, correct RTs were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subjects factor Compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and Condition ('Cat present', 'Cat absent'). To gain insights into the temporal dynamics of the auditory cSEs, we ran additional bin-analyses. To that end we computed, separately for each condition and participant, the RT distributions, which we divided into four bins (quartiles). These data were analyzed by means of an ANOVA with Condition, S-R mapping and Bin as factors.
Results
Reaction times.
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Compatibility, 
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated whether a non-social action event would be able to produce a cSE. Consistent with our hypothesis, the results showed a reliable cSE in the 'Cat present' condition but not in the 'Cat absent' condition. This effect, however, was unaffected by response speed. Even though this demonstrates that the presence of a human co-actor is unnecessary for the effect to occur, one might argue that the cat's face and arm movement induced a certain degree of "socialness", which might be sufficiently similar to the presence of a human being. To rule out this possibility we conducted a second experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the results obtained in Experiment 1 were due to the "social/biological" movement features of the Japanese waving cat. To that end, we repeated Experiment 1 with an irrelevant action event that was devoid of any "social" or "biological" features: a clock.
Method
Sixteen new healthy undergraduate students (10 female; 20-32 years of age, M = 24,5, SD = 3.0) with no history of neurological or hearing problems participated in 14 Experiment 2. They fulfilled the same criteria and were treated in the same way as the participants in Experiment 1. The experimental set-up including design, task, stimuli, amount of trials, and the procedure was as in Experiment 1, except that the Japanese waving cat was replaced by a golden clock that contained a visible continuously rotating element and emitted an audible ticking sound (see Figure 3 ). 
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the results obtained in Experiment 1 were due to the "social'/biological" movement features of the Japanese waving cat. Exchanging "biological" by non-biological movement features revealed a significant cSE only in the presence of salient action events ('Clock present' condition), which increased with increasing RT. To test whether the "socialness" increased the effect obtained in Experiment 1, we combined the data of Experiment 1 and 2 and performed an ANOVA with Compatibility (compatible, incompatible) as a within-subjects factor and Experiment (Experiment 1 -'Cat present' condition, Experiment 2 -'Clock present' condition) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed no significant interaction. In line with previous findings (Dolk et al., 2011) , the present results strongly suggest that even salient non-social events can produce a cSE under solo conditions and suggests that the cSE in the Dolk et al. (2011) study was implemented by salient action events produced by the stroking device and not by some sort of ownership over the stroking device.
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EXPERIMENT 3
Even though the outcome of Experiment 2 demonstrates that social cues are not necessary to produce a cSE, the "bystander"-clock still performed some visible work (expressed by the rotation movement), which we aimed to eliminate in Experiment 3.
We did so by replacing the clock by a metronome that still produced some sort of clicking sound but did not move in any way. According to our theoretical approach, the sound should still be salient enough to draw attention, so that we expected to find a cSE in the 'Metronome present', but not in the 'Metronome absent' condition.
Method
Sixteen new healthy undergraduate students (12 female; 20-32 years of age, M = 24,8, SD = 3.8) with no history of neurological or hearing problems participated in Experiment 3. They fulfilled the same criteria and were treated in the same way as the participants in the previous two experiments. The experimental set-up including design, task, stimuli, amount of trials, and the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that the clock was replaced by a black metronome (height: 9.5cm, width:
6.5cm, depth: 3.5cm) without any moving components ( Figure 5 ). In the 'Metronome present' condition, the metronome was audibly ticking with 80 beats per minute. 
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test whether the cSE depends on some sort of visible movement produced by the object. However, eliminating all visible movement features still produced a reliable cSE, which was unaffected by response speed. It did not even affect the cSE-size: an additional ANOVA on the combined data from Experiments 2 and 3 involving experiment as a between-subject factor did not reveal any significant interaction.
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EXPERIMENT 4
The participants of Experiments 1-3 were all right-handers, so that all the manipulated salient objects were located to the left of the participants' dominant and active hand. According to our theoretical approach, this should not matter because actions would be mainly coded with respect to their relative location (however, see Hommel, 1993 , for minor contributions of the identity of the hand when both hands are used). To test that indication, we replicated the metronome-present condition of Experiment 3 but manipulated the metronome's spatial location ('Metronome left' versus 'Metronome right').
Method
Sixteen new healthy undergraduate students (11 female; 18-31 years of age, M = 24.6, SD = 4.0) with no history of neurological or hearing problems participated in Experiment 4. They fulfilled the same criteria and were treated in the same way as the participants in the previous experiments. The experimental procedure as well as the statistical analysis was as in Experiment 3, with the following exception. The metronome was always present but located to the left of the subject in one condition (a direct replication of the metronome-present condition of Experiment 3) and to the right of the subject in another condition. In the latter, subjects were seated on the left next to an empty chair on the right, with the metronome in front of it. In both conditions, which were counterbalanced across subjects, all subjects were instructed to put their right index finger on the response button in front of them, which was located 25 cm left or right to the midline of the computer monitor (Figure 7 ). In the metronome-right condition, go- EXPERIMENT 5
In all previous experiments, we did not only implement objects, but objects that behaved like events or agents by producing repeated sounds and, as in the case of the Japanese cat, visual movements. From an event perspective, these features are important because they increase the eventhood of the manipulation, which we consider to induce or increase the difficulty to distinguish between the event the participant is producing him-or herself (i.e., the response) and an alternative, action-like event.
However, other interpretations are possible. For instance, participants might interpret the presence of such relatively unusual objects as potentially meaningful, and the mere act of implementing this object as somehow "social" or socially relevant. If so, the eventlike character of the sounds and movements may be irrelevant and any sufficiently unusual object may produce a cSE. To test this assumption, we designed Experiment 5, which replicated Experiment 3 except that the metronome was no longer producing any sound.
Sixteen new healthy undergraduate students (12 female; 20-28 years of age, M = 21,8, SD = 3.8) with no history of neurological or hearing problems participated in Experiment 5. They fulfilled the same criteria and were treated in the same way as the participants in the previous four experiments. The experimental set-up including design, task, stimuli, amount of trials, and the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1-3, except that the black metronome (height: 9.5cm, width: 6.5cm, depth: 3.5cm) no longer produced any sound . The 'Metronome absent' condition was identical except that the metronome was removed, leaving the table on the subject's left empty. -Please insert 
Results
Reaction times.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 5 was to test whether implemented objects need to possess some sort of event character to produce a cSE or whether the mere presence of an object is sufficient. In line with previous findings (Sebanz et al., 2003; 2011), we did not find any evidence for a cSE in the absence of an attention-attracting event, suggesting that it is dynamic events that are responsible for the cSE.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND A REFERENTIAL CODING ACCOUNT
The present study was conducted to determine whether the cSE relies on the presence of another social being or even a human co-actor, as assumed by almost all available theoretical accounts of the joint cSE (e.g., Guagnano et al., 2010; Sebanz et al., 2003; . In contrast to this assumption, we were able to demonstrate reliable cSEs in the absence of biological co-actors in Experiment 1-4 of this study. In Experiment 1, the mechanic arm movement of a Japanese waving cat was sufficient to induce the effect, as were the movement of a clock in Experiment 2 and the auditory rhythm of a non-moving metronome in Experiments 3 and 4. Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that any event, irrespective of its (non-)social or (non-)biological nature, can induce a cSE. Thus, as long as events attract attention and thereby providing a spatial reference frame that allows for coding the participant's own action as left or right, at least auditory stimulus-response compatibility effects are observable. In contrast to this low-level bottom-up induced modulation of task representation, one might argue that the fact of non-social action events implemented by a human experimenter established a deeply social experimental situation that influence an individuals task performance in a rather top-down fashion (see Roepstorff & Frith, 2004 for a more detailed discussion of this issue). However, in line with previous findings (Sebanz et al., 2003) , eliminating the event character associated with the implemented object abolishes the cSE (Experiment 5), suggesting that the social setting of an experimental situation alone is unlikely to modulate task representations in a given go-nogo Simon task.
The RT-distribution analyses showed that the cSE did not vary (Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5) or increased with reaction time (Experiment 2). In contrast, the standard (two-choice) Simon effect commonly decreases with increasing reaction time (e.g., De Jong et al., 1994; Hommel, 1994) , which has been attributed to the decay (Hommel, 1994) or active inhibition (Ridderinkhof, 2002) of the irrelevant spatial stimulus code: the longer it takes to respond the more progressed is the decay or inhibition, and thus the lesser the impact of stimulus location. Go-nogo versions of the Simon effect show a different distribution profile in which the effect size is constant across, or even increases with the reaction time level (Hommel, 1996) . This is indeed suggested by the widely shared idea that the Simon effect reflects competition between the response that is activated by the irrelevant stimulus location and the response that is intentionally selected (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990 ): Response speed is slower in binary-choice tasks, which provides more operation space for spatial stimulus codes to decay. In contrast, responding is relatively fast in go-nogo tasks, so that participants will commonly have responded already before the decay process begins; as a consequence, the size of the effect is rather unaffected by relative response speed within the typical time range of gonogo tasks (Hommel, 1996) . Given that single cSEs tend to produce RT-invariant effect sizes is not surprising that joint cSEs do so as well , and the distributions obtained in the present study nicely fit with this pattern.
Before we turn to the theoretical implications of our findings, let us consider an alternative interpretation. Even though our main goal of adding an object or event to the experimental situation was to replace what in the standard joint cSE set up would be a co-actor, one might argue that this added event mainly functioned as a distractor. It might have attracted attention and, in order to fully concentrate on the task, participants might have suppressed processing information from the area surrounding the distractor.
Considering that this suppression might have affected the entire hemi-field, this might have impaired the processing of stimuli presented on the left side. Given that participants operated the right key, this would mean that processing was more efficient for response-compatible than for response-incompatible stimulus locations for reasons that might not have to do with response selection or a Simon-type effect. Rather, the effect we obtained might represent a kind of inhibition of return effect (IOR; e.g., Maylor & Hockey, 1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984) -an effect that is observed for locations that have been briefly attended and then ignored (i.e., if attention has been moved to another location). Might such a scenario account for our findings?
First, it is important to emphasize that the exact same scenario would also apply to the classical joint cSE (Sebanz et al., 2003; , which then would also be nothing but a spatial-attention effect. Even if that would be the case, our main argument would still hold: that the effect does not imply the obligatory and automatic co-representation of actions or other individuals, as suggested by Sebanz et al. (2006; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009 ) and others (Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006; Welsh, 2009) . Second, even though IOR has also been demonstrated in social situations (Welsh et al., 2005; Welsh et al., 2007) , it seems to rely on the perception of action events produced by the co-actor to induce processes of selective attention (i.e., active inhibition), whereas joint cSEs have been demonstrated in the absence of any co-actor and of any sensory feedback about the co-actors' performance (Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2008; Vlainic et al., 2010) . Third, it is well known that predictable, highly regular and repetitive simulation induces habituation (e.g., Lorch, Anderson & Well, 1984: for overviews, see Cowan, 1995; Näätänen, 1992) , which renders it doubtful whether the continuous presence and repetitive sounds of a Japanese cat or a metronome attract attention to a degree that is necessary for IOR to occur. Finally, we know of no evidence suggesting that IOR is sensitive to the same factors that have been demonstrated to impact the joint cSE, such as body-ownership (Dolk et al., 2011) , self-construal priming (Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012) , or religious belief (Colzato et al., 2012b) . Hence, even though our findings do not provide direct evidence against an IOR account, it is rather unlikely to capture the available evidence on the joint cSE.
A more comprehensive account might be based on the referential-coding approach to the standard Simon effect, according to which the spatial stimulus codes that operate in a Simon task depend on the availability of, and reflect frames or objects of reference (Hommel, 1993) . Our elaborated version of Hommel's (1993) referentialcoding approach is based on the ideomotorically inspired theoretical framework of TEC, the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009 ). According to this framework, and to ideomotor theory in general (James, 1890; Shin, Proctor & Capaldi, 2010; Stock & Stock, 2004) , actions are cognitively represented by codes of their sensory consequences. In particular, TEC assumes that cognitive action representations consist of networks of codes that represent the features of all perceivable action effects, such as the seen or felt location, direction, and speed of an action, the effector it involves, and the object it may relate to ("action concepts" in the terminology of Hommel, 1997) . As a consequence, if a given action is perceived to be "left" or "right" from some reference point, the representation of this action will comprise of a corresponding spatial code. If that code is shared by a stimulus, the processing of the stimulus will activate this code and, thus, prime the action, which explains why spatially varying stimuli facilitate spatially corresponding responses (Hommel, 2007) .
But when is a response or its perceivable effect coded as "left" or "right"?
Given that TEC makes no logical distinction between self-performed actions and other perceived events (Hommel et al., 2001) , this question can be generalized to the question of when, how, and according to which principles people relate objects and events to each other. The most obvious requirement to relate two or more events is that they are comparable, meaning that they are defined by values on a shared dimension (Olson, 1970) . For instance, relating an apple on a table to a sound emitted by a loudspeaker is impossible by referring to the shape or color of the apple or the pitch of the tone (except in a metaphorical way), as these are dimensions that apples and sounds do not share. This consideration makes space and time particularly interesting and privileged, as these are the only two dimensions that almost all conceivable objects and events are defined on. Accordingly, it is not surprising that spatial, but not nonspatial features determine people's choice of reference objects when referring to a target object (Miller, Carlson & Hill, 2011) . Within the spatial dimensions, horizontal and vertical, rather than diagonal, relations are particularly salient (e.g., Logan & Sadler, 1996) . This suggests that, in a Simon task in which stimuli typically vary in a horizontal plane, the horizontal dimension can be considered particularly salient. However, in a standard go-nogo version of the Simon task (or of any other task) obvious reference events are lacking, so that participants are unlikely to code their single response alternative as left or right. Thereby, it seems reasonable that there is typically no overall
Simon effect observed in the individual go-nogo Simon task Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2006) . However, as soon as a sufficiently salient event affords the referential coding of the response, it becomes more likely that participants do code their response in relation to that event. As spatial location is not only the most obvious but, as in the case of a ticking metronome, often the only shared dimension, the relational code is likely to refer to the response's horizontal location relative to the reference event and its comprised features (e. g., perceivable action sounds) -leading to matches or mismatches of spatial stimulus-response codes. Note, however, this is not to say that the coding of alternative action effects is restricted to the availability of responses (Kiernan, Ray, & Welsh, 2012) . Since action effects are cognitively represented by codes of their sensory consequences and the motor pattern which are likely to generate them, responses (i.e., perceivable (auditory or visual) effects of e.g., key presses) are not unlike other sensory effects of action, as long as they are perceived as the mean of an action (e.g., the illumination of a left/right light).
This scenario does not only account for our observation that non-social events are sufficient to produce a cSE in principle (Dittrich, Rothe, & Klauer, 2012; Tsai, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011) ; it might also explain why the size of the cSE shrunk more or less consistently from Experiment 1 to Experiment 4 and finally disappeared in Experiment 5. Even though the corresponding comparisons did not render the differences reliable, it makes sense to assume that the stepwise decrease of the salience of the reference objects throughout Experiment 1-4 reduced the probability that participants generated horizontal relational codes for their actions or the activation levels of these codes. Moreover, in situations where shared action events are lacking such relational codes appear unnecessary as indexed by the disappearance of a cSE in Experiment 5. Along the same lines, it is reasonable to assume that different types of co-actors or reference objects differ in salience. According to TEC, introducing other salient events introduces a discrimination problem (see Ansorge & Wühr, 2004 for a response discrimination account of the SE): the participant now needs to discriminate between the event representation that refers to his or her own action and the representation of the other salient event. As we have argued, successful discrimination is likely to rely on relational spatial coding (i.e., on coding one's action as the "left" or "right" of the alternative events), which implies that the presence of other events make the emergence of spatial stimulus-response compatibility effects more probable.
It makes sense to assume that discrimination will be more difficult (or necessary) the more similar the to-be-discriminated events are. This suggests that the similarity between stimulus and action events ascribed to the participant and co-actor or reference object should matter; in such a way that greater similarity -sharing perceivable (imagined/expected or real; Vlainic et al., 2010) action events on a horizontal Stimulus-Response (S-R) dimension -should lead to greater saliency and a more pronounced cSE. Indeed, spatial cues and hints provided by other humans (or pictures thereof) attract more attention than non-personal spatial information (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton, Watt & Bruce, 2000) . Accordingly, it is not surprising that the cSE is more reliable if the co-actor is a human rather than a computer (Tsai et al., 2008) or puppet (Tsai & Brass, 2007) , and more with a puppet coactor after having seen the puppet performing human-like actions (Müller et al., 2011) .
Given that positive mood induces a more integrating processing style (Hommel, 2012) that can be assumed to increase the perceived similarity between actor and co-actor, one would expect a well pronounced cSE under positive than under negative moodwhich is exactly what has been observed by Kuhbandner et al. (2009) . Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that a positive relationship between actor and co-actor leads to greater perceived similarity (Heider, 1958) , which explains why the cSE is more reliable with a positive than a negative relationship between the two (Hommel et al., 2009 ). If we further consider that irrelevant events attract more attention the closer they are to the relevant event (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Miller, 1991) , it also makes sense that the cSE increases as the distance between actor and co-actor decreases (Guagnano et al., 2010) . However, this is not to deny that jointly interacting with another social being on a go-nogo Simon task may add something unique to the cognitive representation of task events/demands . Whether top-down (e.g., Müller et al., 2011; Stenzel et al., 2012) or bottom-up processes (as may be suggested by the present findings) account for the discrimination problem that typically leads to a (joint) cSE, the available evidence suggest that it might in any case be achieved by referential response coding. To disentangle the contextually dependencies of the two types of processes clearly awaits further research.
More research is also needed to test whether the present findings, which were obtained with an auditory version of the cSE, can be extended to visual versions. On the one hand, there is no particular reason to believe that spatial action coding is different in auditory and visual tasks, so that manipulations of the implemented objects should yield equivalent findings. On the other hand, however, it is possible that using auditory stimuli has left more attentional capacity to process visual aspects of implemented events and/or primed participants to process the auditory aspects of those events, which would not be the case in visual Simon tasks. Moreover, the spatial coding of visual stimuli is easier and more prevalent than the spatial coding of auditory stimuli, which might suggest that visual tasks produce stronger effects than obtained in the present study.
Taken together, our considerations suggest that the cSE can be accounted for by applying the basic principle suggested by TEC without claiming any special status of social situations and the socialness of a co-actor or other salient events. As demonstrated, any (reasonably salient) event can produce a cSE, which means that the cSE does not necessarily imply the co-representation of tasks. Nevertheless, given the evidence that the size of the cSE is a function of the actual interpersonal relationship and the perceived interpersonal relationship, it does seem to be a valid diagnostic tool that may be taken to reflect the degree of interpersonal integration (Colzato et al., 2012; Colzato et al., 2012b; Dolk, Liepelt, Villringer, Prinz, & Ragert, 2012) . Hence, while the FOOTNOTES 1. The only condition under which individual participants can be observed to produce a Simon effect in a go-nogo task is when they have used the alternative response relatively recently (e.g., in the previous trial or just a few trials ago; Hommel, 1996) . This observation fits with the claim that we will develop in the following: that single responses are spatially coded (which is a necessary precondition for the Simon effect to occur) only if sufficiently salient alternative events are cognitively represented, so that the individual needs to discriminate between the representations of this event and the actually required response.
2. Strictly speaking, this would also include the stimuli used to signal the responses in a task. However, there are reasons to assume that stimulus representations are integrated to some degree with the representations of the responses they signal (Wenke, Gaschler & Nattkemper, 2007) , which renders it unnecessary to select responses "against" stimuli. 
